This paper argues that corruption is used on a systematic basis as a mechanism of direct and indirect administrative control from the state level down to local authorities and administrations of public and private institutions. Informal approval of corrupt activities in exchange for loyalty and compliance with the regime is commonplace in many countries. This paper explains how corrupt regimes maximize their position in terms of loyalty and compliance by using the example of the 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine. It presents mechanisms by which political bureaucracies politicize universities in order to influence students and channel their electoral power during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine.
Introduction
Ukraine has a strategic location between Europe and Asia, remains geopolitically indecisive, squeezed between the West and Russia. This geopolitical position predetermines high interest in the country. Surprisingly, little was said about this nation since it gained independence after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. Strategic developments in the region, including the interests of the European Union, NATO, 1 and Russia, warrant more focus on Ukraine in the near future. The battle for Ukraine so far has been a very bleak. More attention to the country's political development may be expected over the next few decades. Political life in
Ukraine remains terra incognita, indeed. Ukrainian authorities constantly face serious challenges.
The ruling regime is not monolithic, but consists of competing groups. These groups' future political prospects depend heavily on the popular support they can receive from the public.
Recent political events in Ukraine that have become known as the Orange Revolution and its aftermath raise questions about their moving forces. Answering these questions presents an opportunity to learn from the events. This paper addresses the role of universities in political changes in Ukraine, and more specifically, the mechanisms by which universities are turned into active political players and the grounds on which these mechanisms operate.
On the one hand, students are involved heavily in political actions and the voting process.
On the other hand, higher education institutions (HEIs) in Ukraine are notoriously corrupt. The question to be researched is how these two might be linked? This paper presents the concept of corruption as a mechanism of administrative control and shows how it may be applied to HEIs in order to politicize them and channel student power to benefit certain candidates in the presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine. It uses comparisons with other former Soviet republics to better highlight the issue and sustain the line of argumentation.
pull the country in different directions. Moreover, even within branches of the government, contradictions are rife. The Minister of the Interior, Lutsenko, calls his subordinates to interact with other law enforcement agencies only through the leadership of the Ministry. 9 The lack of real authority results in the lack of subordination. Some ministers refuse to leave their positions, ignoring the Presidential orders. 10 By doing this, they appear to be in solidarity with the Members of Verhovna Rada, who also refuse to accept the Presidential order of dismissal. Legal loopholes and discontent between the executive and judicial branches create a sense of anarchy.
Judges cancel the President's order for new parliamentary elections and the President in response fires judges, closes courts, and restructures Kiev's administrative court system.
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All of the political players use external forces to settle their political scores. They appeal to the public with facts and arguments that are of interest to the majority. The issues at stake include playing the language card, as is the case with Russian language status in the interpretation of Yanukovych, and attracting credit from the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
as is the case with Premier Timoshenko. 12 Timoshenko points to a possible conditionality and connection between the IMF loan and the recall of the new elections. 13 No appeals are made, however, to the domestic constituents. All of the players readily change positions depending on their personal interests, the balance of power, and the current political situation.
14 Students become one of the major political forces, if not the major one. There are 2,709,000 students in Ukraine, of which 2,309,000 study in 749 public HEIs, and the other 400,000 in 202 private HEIs. 15 HEIs include universities, academies, colleges, community colleges, and vocational schools. The number of students per 10,000 inhabitants is one of the largest in Europe and amounts to 578. The total number of faculty members is 192,157, and guaranteeing a faculty/student ratio of 1 to 14. This is especially true for Kiev, the major political battlefield and the student city. Students not only equate to votes, but they also form active groups of support or opposition capable of taking to the streets. They can also be mobilized quickly relative to other groups of the population. This was proven during the Orange Revolution, when political parties relied heavily on students. This was reliance not as much on the students' votes as on students' street actions. Since political instability become more and more of a normal condition in Ukraine's political life, the competing forces will eventually turn to their constituents, first of all students. In order to attract students' votes and active support, the ruling regime may use different tactics, including informal means of control. The corruption of Ukraine's universities may be used by the regime in order to secure such a support.
The concept of corruption and coercion
The word corrupt comes from Latin corruptus and means rotten; depraved, wicked;
influenced by bribery. 16 The definition of corruption in education includes the abuse of authority for material gain and is broadly defined as the abuse or misuse of public office or public trust for personal or private gain. 17 The terms abuse and misuse, public office and public trust, personal and private gain, are often used interchangeably. Heyneman (2004) 22 The number of reported incidents in Ukraine rose two-and-a-half-fold between 1990 and 1998 to 2,449, and these incidents led to 1,641 convictions. 23 Numerous surveys in the Russian Federation reveal the same situation with corruption. 24 More than half of all Russians had to pay a bribe at least once in their lives, while 19 percent do it quite often. Most often bribes are paid for medical services (51 percent of the respondents), followed by traffic violations (31 percent of the respondents) and educational services (20 percent of the respondents).
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Corruption is traditionally considered an indication of a weak state. Zhdanov (2001) presents the following view on the relation of state to corruption: "Corruption and government are eternal antagonists. Corruption, as a form of social corrosion, 'eats away' governmental structures, while governmental authority in turn strives to destroy corruption." 26 We argue the opposite based on Darden's (2002) definition of the state "as a compulsory rule-making organization that is sustained through the extraction of wealth from within its territorial domain." 27 Darden (2001 Darden ( , 2002 describes the vulnerability of assets acquired by illegal means and the mechanism by which the government officials subordinate their lower-level counterparts:
"Hence, the threat of exposing and enforcing his wrongdoing constitutes an enormously powerful sanction and places lower-level officials in an especially vulnerable position. The severity of this sanction allows the state leadership to practice a systematic form of blackmail, with payment exacted not in cash but in obedience." 28 Darden (2008) further develops the idea of corruption and coercion as a mechanism of state repression and domination and considers graft to be an informal state institution. 29 The author uses cross-country data and examples to sustain this argument and focuses on political events in Ukraine. This approach to the governance was highlighted earlier by Andreski (1966 Andreski ( , 1968 30 and Banfield (1975 The concept of corruption and coercion is based on the idea that the state deliberately underpays its public employees, forces them to get involved in corruption in order to supplement their income, then collects evidence of wrongdoing or so-called kompromat, 36 and coerces them into compliance. 37 Karklins (2005) addresses the issue of the usage of kompromat for political blackmail and coercion and writes, "A politically damaging practice is to misuse investigative and judicial power to intimidate citizens and political rivals." 38 The same mechanism of the state-based corruption and coercion in Ukraine is described by Zhdanov, who writes about the selective application of the criminal law and other repressive legal measures to government officials and politicians and characterizes them as "The use of juridical reprisals against political opponents by means of charging them with corruption (or other illegal acts) when there are no legal grounds to do so." 39 Often the laws or the normative acts are composed post-ante in order to prosecute citizens for an activity that took place at the time when it was not illegal. Grey areas in the changing legislation are also used by the regime. Legal craftsmanship is one of the essential features of the government that uses its authority for the purpose of selective justice.
The political rhetoric is impressive: corrupt politicians claim that they are prosecuted because they are in opposition to the corrupt regime while the regime states that it fights corrupt politicians. 
State-university relations
In order to follow how mechanism of corruption and coercion may be applied to higher education, we will first consider the relations of universities and the state in an historical perspective. It should be said that at the time when the first institutions of higher learning emerged in Middle Ages Europe, there were no nation-states and there were no social institutions according to our contemporary understanding. Medieval universities did not play a significant role in social life and the state did not pay much attention to politicization of these institutions. State leaders and the church used universities for their political purposes and exerted control over the curriculum. By granting special status to the university, the state leader received a tool for influencing the town where this university was located. It granted university students and professorate certain immunities and privileges and consequently expected loyalty in exchange. In its turn, the Catholic Church was influencing states by using universities as one of the tools of internal pressure. From this it may be concluded that universities were historically important ideological institutions and gained more weight in being politicized. The church, the city governors, and the local leaders were all interested in controlling universities and securing their loyalty in order to sustain themselves. University autonomy, i.e. faculty self government, was not attempted, for the curator simply appointed a 'director' while not permitting election of a rector or the convening of a council until late in the decade." 43 The result of this top-down approach in governing the established rather than emerging university was that professors did not have much freedom. There was not much professors could do about it other than leave.
In distinction from Kazan, Kharkov University in Ukraine has developed successfully thanks to the centralized power and effort of the state-appointed curator: "Kharkov was not so badly off as Kazan, in great part because its curator S. O. Potocki, energetically pursued his task in recruiting faculty, insisted on the election of rector and council according to the statutes, and even found a way to borrow students from the church's local college, when too few students enrolled to make feasible the opening of the university in 1805." 44 The centralized effort of the state brought forth fruits. According to Flynn (1988) , "By the late 1830s, none of the universities had fewer than four hundred students while Moscow enrolled nearly nine hundred." 45 This state involvement in the process of university building may be explained by two facts: first, the state was the only force capable of creating the university system; and second, the state was interested in creating a system where state control would be an immanent part of the existence of the universities.
Flynn (1988) describes the position of the state authorities regarding control over universities: "Tsar Nicolas I meant clearly to answer the university question by blocking the university's ability to promote change. He wanted the universities to serve the common good by supporting the autocratic Russia he had inherited from Peter the Great and his successors. This proved difficult, perhaps impossible, even in the short run. It was difficult even to find new rectors, unless the government was willing to pass over the men obviously best qualified for the posts. Thus, the rectors appointed were the same men previously elected." 46 A strong state facilitated the development of the university system in the Russian Empire, but at the same time significantly restricted university autonomy that would appear quite natural in a different setting.
The Soviet system of higher education inherited some of the essential features of its predecessor -the university system of the Russian Empire. Weak university self-governance was counterbalanced by strong state control. As Azrael (1965) with the rules get access to some state and federal funds through participation in grants, programs, and projects. 48 But there are informal ways of influencing universities as well.
Sometimes the ruling regime can encourage universities to ignore the rules, formally set by the regime.
In the US, universities and students are active players in political life. Students were more active in 1960s and 1970s, while universities today are more active in political lobbying. 49 Constitutional autonomy of the universities was diminished in exchange for the state and national grants, subsidies, and indirect funding in form of student aid and student loans. This trend may change in time, and public universities may regain their autonomy from the state, but the fact itself speaks to the tendency of the central authorities to control higher education institutions and their willingness to negotiate and trade the autonomy in exchange for funding or possibly some other benefits. Informal control of the state over universities compensates for the lack of balance between the formal authority and the real power that the state has over universities. It may also be used in order to disguise methods of administrative control that might be unpopular with the public and the constituents of the system.
In Ukraine, rules and regulations, including accreditation, curriculum, degree requirements, and regimentation of the academic process, are used by the state as tools of administrative control. Often the tool becomes more important than the regulation itself. This control becomes even more important when educational space is occupied not only by the state universities, but by independent private HEIs as well. The financial independence of private institutions is disturbing and so authorities are trying to develop more tools and mechanisms of control. The introduction of vouchers for higher education and the entitlement of private colleges to participate in competition for these vouchers was one such mechanism of indirect control.
Once independent private institutions are invited to compete for governmentally distributed public funds, they become interested in being qualified for participation. This qualification is based on the discretion of the central authorities. The major task is to control not only public universities that always were and remain under the authority of the related ministries, but also private colleges. In Ukraine, universities are transformed into objects of public policy.
University politicization
The vertical structure of control in higher education incorporates the principal-agent frame. A special interest of administrative control through corruption and coercion is applied to higher education. This special interest is closely linked to and often indivisible from the general interest, but it is based on the distinctive features of higher education, including its special role in the society and its organizational and cultural characteristics and norms. Universities became by far the most important institutions for political socialization nationally and even internationally.
For Almond (1960) , "Political socialization is the process of induction into the political culture." 50 The importance of the educational system in codifying people in the process of political socialization is formulated by as follows: "The concept of political socialization is now an accepted part of the vocabulary of political science. It refers to that process by which individuals acquire attitudes and feelings toward the political system and toward their role in it, including cognition (what one knows or believes about the system, its existence as well as its modus operandi), feeling (how one feels toward the system, including loyalty and a sense of civic obligation), and one's sense of political competence (what one's role is or can be in the system). The educational system is one of the agencies involved in this process, which begins at birth and, also its imprint is most pronounced during the impressionable formative years, continues well into adulthood." 51 Universities have substantial political power due to three major facts. First, the university professorate constitutes the most intelligent part of the society and its elite. Professors often participate in political life, occupy public offices, and work as consultants and advisors to politicians, public officials, and administrators. Second, students in many countries are one of the major political forces that are easy to politicize and mobilize for social actions. Califano (1970) describes student unrest and states that Japanese radical students appear to be, by far, the most successful in the world in disrupting the social order. He writes: "Tokyo University was paralyzed by a student strike throughout 1968. It took eight thousand policemen two days to evict radical students from the main hall of the University in January 1969 -a two-day siege, similar to the later one at Kyoto, which ended an occupation that had lasted for over six months." 52 For Jarausch (1974) , student movements are often more successful in shaping a critical generational identity than in achieving practical political, social, or institutional aims. He points out that the failure of the student movement to reach its reforming goals, largely due to its elitism, may lead to the incompleteness of modernization. 53 Third, universities are large enterprises that involve not only employees, i.e. faculty, administration, and staff, but also their immediate consumers, i.e. students. American students' active citizenry position moved universities onto a new level. Altbach (2005) points out that "The very success of the universities in moving to the center of society meant that they were taken more seriously." 54 The antiwar movement of 1960s emerged from university campuses, where it was most powerful. 55 In
Ukraine, politicization is considered not as an alternative, an opposition to the state, but as an influence of the state instituted in order to gain support.
In Russia, universities are being criticized for politicization. A plan to establish a school of Political Sciences at Moscow State University (MGU) is being considered part of such a process. 56 MGU wants to resolve the problem with lack of managerial resources in the country by establishing a "party school." 57 Many think that the school will prepare cadres for Edinaya Rossiya, a political party of Putin. 58 The university administration is accused of politicizing the university. The opposition calls students to resist such a move. It seems contradictory and ironic that students are called to stay away from political life by resisting changes in a political manner. 59 The Rector of MGU insists that the university will remain politically neutral. 60 Rector
Sadovnichiy dismisses the speculations that the leader of Edinaya Rossiya, Boris Gryzlov, will have a direct relation to the leadership of the School of Political Sciences in MGU. 61 He says that there are many leading politicians teaching in MGU, including Volodin, Kokoshin, Zhirinovsky, and Ziuganov. 62 According to Sadovnichiy, this should not be interpreted as a sign of the politicization of MGU. Nevertheless, some educators point out that the party of power Edinaya Rossiya has intentions to limit the authority of the rector himself and establish oversight over the university, if not absolute governmental control, then at least party oversight. The safe transfer of the presidency in Russia in 2007 from Putin to Medvedev became possible thanks, in part, to the help of Edinaya Rossiya, described by many as a replication of KPSS.
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University corruption
Higher education in Ukraine is affected by corruption. The President of Ukraine, Viktor
Yushchenko, has asked state universities throughout the country to curtail the corruption that is endemic to admissions processes and called upon rectors and professors to put a stop to the bribery and cronyism that hold sway during entrance exams, widespread practices he characterized as "shameful and humiliating." registered in HEIs in that year, of which 11 were in Kiev. 67 The number of cases of bribery in higher education, reported by the Ministry, appears to be but a tip of the iceberg for the industry, plagued with corruption. 68 Admissions to publicly funded places in HEIs are notoriously corrupt, presenting a big business for faculty and administrators. The population accepts this situation as a norm. 42 percent of the parents of prospective students said that instead of wasting time on preparation of their children for college entry examinations, they would rather seek other ways and means, including informal payments and connections. 69 Osipian (2009) The level of cheating and toleration of cheating--an indicator of the looseness of control and corruptness of the educational systems--may be applied to the concept of corruption and coercion. The tolerance of cheating across nations varies significantly. In Ukraine, university faculty often turn a blind eye on student cheating. They think that they will always be able to distinguish a good student from the rest. This perception is also based on the willingness to control the student body and exercise the authority of assigning grades depending on personal relations and attitudes towards particular students rather than on their academic progress.
Magnus's et al. (2002) findings indicate that cheating in universities is well-tolerated in the
former Soviet republics while in the US it is not, and Western European countries are in the middle. 72 The level of cheating characterizes relations between professors and their students.
According to the principal-agent perspective, professors in corrupt universities are principals and students appear to be their agents. Professors exercise coercive power over students and either punish them for cheating or turn a blind eye depending on students' compliance with professors' demands.
Corruption of the politicized university
The emerging quasi-meritocracy in Ukraine's universities is characterized by the channeling of informal authority along the vertical axis of control in corrupt hierarchies. These were pointed out in Waite and Allen's (2003) analysis of corruption and abuse of power in educational administration. 73 Heyneman (2007) University corruption gives the ruling regime the opportunity to control HEIs. 75 Control over the universities means control over their curriculum, ideology, and behavior, and is a high stake for regimes that want to sustain themselves. points to the continuing pressure on universities from the state, offering an opinion that comes from Tbilisi State University (TSU) in Georgia: "The question is whether the new governments can manage the urge to control opinions in the university that contradict their own. According to the faculty member at TSU, the new government intervened for political reasons, just like the Soviets: our first rector in the new government was asked to fire certain professors who were not liked by the government. He refused, and instead he was fired….We are still in a situation when we are under stress for our opinions, and these could be a threat to our lives." 76 Apparently, political indoctrination of universities is advanced by the ruling regimes in the former Soviet Bloc through informal means, while academic meritocracy is no longer honored.
The state is not interested in eradicating corruption in universities. Instead, it is interested in politicizing them. This may be a long term policy, because the country faces elections after elections. Lack of power, insufficient legitimacy, and group fights complicate political situation in Ukraine. The only solution for each of these competing groups is to turn to constituents directly. This would be similar to Yeltsin's appeal to his constituents during the standoff between the President and the Parliament in 1993. For now, there is only one mechanism: administrative pressure. This administrative pressure is exercised in two ways: so-called kryshevanie, 77 or patronage, and corruption and coercion. Ukraine is moving toward a condition of permanent elections, but will eventually need to reach a steady state.
While state funding of HEIs is constantly decreasing, there are other mechanisms of control being used by political regimes. Replacement of direct state funding as one of the primary mechanisms of control over the universities by the corruption and coercion mechanism is an obvious trend in Ukraine. Political bureaucracies take over university autonomy and influence students by dictating the faculty and administrators their will. Figure 1 presents the hierarchical structure that facilitates such a dictate, identified as the pyramid of administrative dictate in the higher education sector.
Politicians in power (personal and group interest and threat to lose power) Central and local authorities (personal interest and threat to be replaced by competitors)
Professional administrations (Ministries, departments) (discretion over universities and corruptness and vulnerability) University administration (discretionary power over the faculty and corruptness and vulnerability) Faculty (discretionary power over the students along with corruptness and vulnerability) Students The voting mechanisms used in Ukraine might be "voluntary-forceful," but freedom of choice is preserved. The calculations are that students will vote for the "right" or "our"
candidate. And these calculations appear to be true as the Orange Revolution shows. They were true in Kiev and they were true in Donbass. Substantial administrative reform will be needed to change this way of doing things and getting things "done." Ukraine faces this problem in the coming presidential and parliamentary elections.
The university faculty understand that their position presents them with opportunities for generating illicit benefits in addition to their miserable salaries. The government forces the instructors to act unethically by not paying them on time or paying them below the poverty level.
An indulgence, as a necessary detail in the mechanism of corruption and coercion, is presented here in the form of informal approval, most often expressed as the views of public officials and administrators and the tolerance of the general public. The Rector of MGU says that the government needs to pay higher salaries to college faculty instead of organizing demonstrative prosecutions for those who collect illicit benefits from students. 80 Introduction of standardized computer graded tests intended to replace oral entry examinations in universities may be considered in part as yet another tool of governmental pressure on HEIs. 81 In Ukraine, entry examinations to colleges are highly corrupt, and admissions based on the test results threaten a substantial portion of the faculty's illicit incomes.
Universities oppose the test and call to preserve entry examinations. 82 The Minister of Science and Education recognizes that he also had concerns about the test, but states that the test is going to be successful. He says that some of the rectors refused to acknowledge the test and to run testbased admissions. Nikolaenko had to explain to these rectors that if they will not recognize the test and will not agree with the policies of test-based admissions, he will find others, who will. 83 What he meant by that is that those educational leaders who will refuse to comply with the new state policies, will be dismissed or removed from their offices. Administrative pressures come on the universities not only from the Ministry, but from the political parties as well. For instance, after the Orange Revolution, the President of Ukraine called for some rectors to resign. 84 Apparently, the rectors were accused in attempts to politicize and directly pressure their subordinates and students in order to extract their political support for given candidates. individual calculations and the pursuit of personal interests. 86 The university administration is interested in preserving the student body since student tuition and fees constitute a significant and stable part of the university revenues. In private universities this is the only source of revenue. Instructors often accept bribes in exchange for positive grades on term papers, midterms, homework assignments, and final and examinations. There are two major reasons for them to do so. The first reason is obvious: faculty members make their living from bribes. The second reason is that the faculty members are under the administration's pressure. The administration encourages the faculty to assign passing grades to the students so that they continue to enroll and pay their tuition. This is primarily an issue of the institution's financial survival and soundness and only then an issue of morality and prestige. Institutional reputation, professional ethics, and academic stance are all jeopardized by the prioritization of financial survival on institutional and individual levels. This type of short-sightedness and focus on shortterm benefits prevents long term plans of restructuring and build up of institutional reputation by universities and academic departments.
The university administration turns a blind eye on faculty misconduct and bribery and often encourages faculty members to settle their issues with students and to help students out. At The retired are a growing group due to demographics, but they may be less active now than they were in early 1990. Students may play more significant role. Thus, the fight for students' votes becomes fierce. Political indoctrination of the academia occurs through targeting faculty and administrators. It is cheaper for a political group to gain the support of students through the indoctrination of the HEI, than to gain it directly from each student. Thus, there is no reason for the state to dismantle the corruption and coercion mechanism.
Students are young and healthy, and so can spend hours and days in winter cold to demonstrate support for their leaders and press on the authorities. Students are independent; some live in students' dormitories and so are free from their parents' supervision, and most have The experience of medieval universities run by students is very interesting in terms of their control over the townsmen-suppliers of their housing, food, clothing, and other products--and professors. Collective action that was used by the students as a weapon in struggling for their rights presents certain interest in many countries, including the process of unionization of graduate students in the US, student unions in Europe, and spontaneous group actions of protest by students in Ukraine. According to Haskins (1957) , student universities represent an organized form of protection of students and their interests by themselves. This priority of studentconsumer is described by Haskins in the following way: "The students of Bologna organized such a university first as a means of protection against townspeople, for the price of rooms and necessaries rose rapidly with the crowd of new tenants and consumers, and the individual student was helpless against such profiteering. United, the students could bring the town to terms by the threat of departure as a body, secession, for the university, having no buildings, was free to move, and there are many historic examples of such migrations. Better rent one's rooms for less than not rent them at all, and so the student organizations secured the power to fix the prices of lodgings and books through their representatives." 97 As we have mentioned before, students in Ukraine try to put professors under control in order to receive high quality lecture time, seminars, and updated teaching materials. Similar processes took place in medieval universities. Student actions were focused on protection of their interests. Haskins describes student demands to their professors in Italian universities:
"Victorious over the townsmen, the students turned on 'their other enemies, the professors.' Here the threat was a collective boycott, and as the masters lived at first wholly from the fees of their pupils, this threat was equally effective. The professor was put under bond to live up to a minute set of regulations which guaranteed his students the worth of the money paid by each." Student self-governance in Ukraine may be in process of its development, but this development is top-down. 99 Minister Nikolaenko comments on the limitations and the advisory role of student self-governance body by saying that "the horse will never be put before the cart."
In his view, student self-governance has to deal with extracurricular activities, cultural events, accommodations in student dormitories, social benefits, and even selection of students to internships abroad. Academic progress, retention, and attrition are to remain within the domain of university faculty and administrators. To the minister's regret, the President vetoed the law about student self-governance. The relations between students and universities are clearly not without tension. Nikolaenko says that there is a war between students, faculty, and administrators and that university rectors are interested in delegating some of the authority to student councils.
He also says that the proposed law anticipates participation of students in the school and university boards that make decisions. So far students are helping the Minister to remove private firms from student dormitories, of which there are 300 in Kiev alone. 100 Despite the Minister's assurances and visible interest in advancing student selfgovernance, the tensions between the Ministry and the students are all ahead. One of the recent events is the student demonstrations in Lviv, where students picketed local authorities. The reason was the intent of the Ministry of Education to introduce entry examination to masters programs for those, who graduated from baccalaureate programs in the same university. This novelty would threaten students' right to transfer naturally to their fifth and sixth years of studies without any payments and examinations.
Conclusion
The positive role of the state in developing and sustaining corruption is often underestimated. According to the concept presented in this paper, strengthening of the state through a vertical administrative hierarchy is exactly what is necessary to advance the policy of corruption and coercion. This policy, in turn, leads to further strengthening of the state machine.
Students in many countries are one of the major political forces and are easy to politicize and mobilize for social actions. The regime attempts to control students by controlling universities.
Control over universities means control over their curriculum, ideology, and behavior, and is a highest stake for the regimes that want to sustain themselves. While state funding for universities is constantly decreasing, there are other mechanisms of control taking place. The replacement of direct state funding as one of the primary mechanisms of control over the universities by the corruption and coercion mechanism is an obvious trend in Ukraine.
Both of the candidates have used administrative resources to influence voters.
Yanukovych allegedly used his position of Prime Minister for political purposes. University administrations as well as faculty were heavily involved in promotion of "their candidate" on both sides. It is quite possible that some of them indeed supported their respective candidates, but they used their administrative, coercive, and professional power to involve students in all types of political activities, i.e. turned universities into politicized institutions guided by a certain political agenda rather than freedom of choice. Many of those who supported or opposed the Orange Revolution truly believed in what they were doing, others did not really understood the situation, some simply followed the crowd, and many were forced to do so.
Students were pushed into politics the same way they were forced to participate in the May Day demonstrations in soviet times, by way of coercion, based on administrative orders then and mechanisms of corruption and coercion, and indirect pressure now. The presidential elections are over, but the battle for students' minds and votes continues. The fundamental force with which students can resist and oppose university corruption and political dictate is their
